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I. Introduction
"This is a fraudulent press activity and a stunt," said Eric
Wohlschlegel of the United States Chamber of Commerce on
October 19, 2009.' This "stunt" was pulled off by the Yes Men, a
parody group that describes itself as a "'genderless, loose-knit
association of some 300 impostors worldwide who agree their way
into the fortified compounds of commerce'-and then unleash the
clowns of public relations war."' Thus, the Chamber filed a lawsuit
against the Yes Men, claiming, amongst other things, trademark
infringement under the Lanham Act.
This lawsuit is typical of the type of litigation stemming from the
Lanham Act. The court hearing the claims of the Chamber will
* University of California, Hastings College of Law, J.D. Candidate 2011.
University of California, B.A. Political Science, minor in Jewish Studies. I would like to
thank the editors of the Comm/Ent for their hard work, along with Professor Sonia Katyal
and Allison B. Margolin, Esq. for their very helpful suggestions and ideas. I would also
like to thank the never-ending cycle of First Amendment litigation, which more than
anything has provided for interesting journal topics since America's founding.
1. Matthew Lasar, EFF Defends Yes Men From Business Rage Over Climate Hoax,
ARs TECHNICA (Oct. 23, 2009, 11:30 AM), http://arstechnica.com/web/news/2009/10/eff-
tells-business-group-to-get-over-yes-men-hoax.ars.
2. Id.
3. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Chamber of Commerce of the US v.
Servin, 1:09-cv-02014-RWR (filed Oct. 26, 2009).
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mediate the balancing act between trademark and First Amendment
protection. However, the case law virtually ignores the novelty of
having an advocacy group as the plaintiff. Although many elements
must be satisfied to prove a trademark infringement, the elements of
confusion and commercial intent are considerably easier to show
when an advocacy group operates significantly in the business and
political realms.'
Just as government entities deserve special latitude in trademark
infringement claims, so do advocacy groups and, by extension,
governmental agencies. The public interest in preventing disastrous
consumer confusion outweighs the First Amendment interests of
parody groups. This paper will be divided into three parts. The first
two sections will cover consumer confusion and commercial intent,
the two main elements of a Lanham Act trademark infringement
claim. The third section will reconcile the two competing public
policy concerns of trademark and First Amendment protection.
II. Background
At the heart of this conflict between the Chamber and the Yes
Men are the provisions of the Lanham Act, which was passed by
Congress in 1946.6 The Commerce Clause of the Constitution grants
Congress the authority to enact such legislation.! The idea behind the
legislation "was to grant more rights to the trademark owners by
giving them a cause of action to protect their investments in the
advertising process."' Proponents of the legislation argued that it
would benefit the consumers, "who were unable to police trademark
infringements on their own."'
The Trademark Protection Act of 1881 and a modified statute in
1905 preceded the current trademark legislation enacted by
Congress." The 1905 modification increased protections for
trademark holders (and consumers, arguably) by lowering the
standard for proving a violation of the federal Act." Congress passed
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1946).
5. Id.
6. Samuel Feng, Trademark: Its History, Influence, and Issues, CONNEXIONS (Sept.
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the Lanham Act in the wake of a huge consumer boom after World
War II in 1946.12
The lawsuit at hand deals with a trademark infringement claim
where the U.S. Chamber of Commerce claims that the Yes Men
infringed on the Chamber's trademark." In response to the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce's recent criticism of climate change
legislation, the Yes Men created a website announcing a phony press
conference where they would discuss issues such as the Chamber's
"new" stance on environmental policy.14 At this press conference, a
Yes Men member calling himself Hingo Sembra, deputy to U.S.
Chamber of Commerce President and CEO Tom Donahue, stated
that the Chamber had reversed its policy on climate change
legislation." This caused considerable confusion, as for a short time,
news outlets such as Reuters and Fox News were reporting from the
phony website and press conference that the Chamber had reversed
its position." Apparently, the parody had worked a little too well. A
week later, the Chamber sued the Yes Men for trademark
infringement, stating that the parody had caused consumer
confusion."
The Yes Men prank was well-timed, coming shortly after the
Chamber's announcement that it was against environmental
legislation as being bad for business. This statement had caused the
likes of Pacific, Gas & Electric ("PG&E") and certain gas companies
such as Exelon18 to leave the Chamber, which claims to represent over
three million businesses." Since its formation in 1912, the
Chamber's purpose has been to advocate for the interests of big
12. Id.
13. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 1, Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v.
Servin, 1:09-cv-02014-RWR (filed Oct. 26,2009).
14. Wendy Davis, US Chamber of Commerce Sues Yes Men For Creating 'Fraudulent'
Site, MEDIAPOST (Oct. 27, 2009, 8:45 PM), http://www.mediapost.com/publications
/?fa=Articles.showArticle&artaid=116230.
15. Id.
16. Dana Milbank, The News is Broken, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-yn/content/article/2009/10/19/AR2009101902988.html.
17. Lasar, supra note 1.
18. Apple, Citing Climate, tells US Chamber iQuit, REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2009), available
at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0519277320091005.
19. About U.S. Chamber Small Business Nation, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
SMALL BUSINESS NATION, http://www.uschambersmallbusinessnation.com/about-us/ (last
visited Aug. 25,2010).
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business.20 Its board of directors consists of more than a hundred
senior executives at major companies such as Dow Chemical, Charles
Schwab, and AT&T." Although the Chamber is known for its
support of and membership from large businesses, the Chamber
claims that ninety-six percent of its members are small businesses.'
In 2009 alone, the Chamber spent $65.2 million in lobbying.
Thus, the Yes Men decided to tackle one of the largest advocacy
groups in the nation. This is not new for them. The group is known
for forming mock websites and posing as phony spokespersons for the
purpose of parodying large corporations or governmental entities.
For example, the group's most notorious stunt to date was against the
World Trade Organization ("WTO").2 4 The Yes Men created a
phony website for the group and spoke for the WTO, encouraging
corporations to purchase votes from its citizens and arguing that the
U.S. Civil War was a waste of money because slaves were easy to
secure from the third world.2 To add to the ridiculousness of the
claims, they then unveiled a gold spandex body suit which had the
ability to oversee workers. 26 The Chamber, interestingly enough, has
been the first entity to sue the Yes Men.
The complaint against the Yes Men, which the Chamber filed on
October 26, 2009, contains eight causes of action: trademark
infringement under the Lanham Act,27 unfair competition under the
Lanham Act," trademark dilution under the Lanham Act, false
advertising under the Lanham Act,29 cyberpiracy under the Anti-
Cyber Squatting Consumer Protection Act, unlawful trade practices,
20. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, MEDIA MATTERS ACTION NETWORK
http://mediamattersaction.org/transparency/organization/USChamber-ofCommerce
(last visited Aug. 25, 2010).
21. Board of Directors, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, http://www.uschamber.
com/about/board/board-directors (last visited Aug. 25, 2010).
22. About U.S. Chamber Small Business Nation, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
SMALL BUSINESS NATION, http://www.uschambersmallbusinessnation.com/about-us/ (last
visited Aug. 25, 2010).
23. David J. Lynch, "Change" puts U.S. Chamber of Commerce on the Spot, USA
TODAY (Nov. 12, 2009, 1:53 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/2009-11-
11-Chamber11_cvN.htm.




27. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1946).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1946).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1946).
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publication of injurious falsehood, and a prima facie tort.0 The
complaint's prayer for relief includes injunctive and declaratory
relief.31 In addition, the complaint claims that the prank against the
Chamber was a publicity stunt the Yes Men used to promote their
upcoming film, The Yes Men Fix the World.32 The film was released
on October 23, 2009, just days after the incident.33 It "is a screwball
true story that follows a couple of gonzo political activists as they
infiltrate the world of big business and pull off outrageous pranks that
point out how corporate greed is destroying the planet."4 Thus, the
Chamber claims that a prank such as the one pulled against the
Chamber would essentially be a preview for the upcoming film.
I. Consumer Confusion
At the crux of the issue of whether confusion should play a role in
the debate between trademark and the right of free speech is the
American experience with social critique. Professor Sonia Katyal
identifies the concept of a dynamic "semiotic democracy" (coined by
media studies professor John Fiske) as the "type of world where
audiences freely and widely engage in the use of cultural symbols in
response to the forces of media."" Katyal points out that a semiotic
democracy is symptomatic of a functioning political democracy where
"'political democracy' describes a system in which individual citizens
are able to participate in the exercise of political power, [and]
'semiotic democracy' describes a system in which individual citizens
are able to participate in the creation of cultural meaning."" Katyal
goes on to argue that principles of trademark and copyright
ownership have jeopardized the semiotic democracy, sanctifying the
symbols and images of corporations. In turn, this has led artists to
abandon projects for fear of suit.37
Another reaction to the consecration of trademark and copyright
principles in this area is the formation of what Katyal calls "semiotic
30. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 2-3, Chamber of Commerce of the US v.
Servin, 1:09-cv-02014-RWR (filed Oct. 26,2009).
31. Id. at 3.
32. THE YES MEN FIX THE WORLD (Shadow Distribution 2009).
33. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 6, Chamber of Commerce of the US v.
Servin, 1:09-cv-02014-RWR (filed Oct. 26,2009).
34. The Yes Men Fix the World, THE INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE,
http://www.imdb. com/video/wab/vil429472025/ (last visited Aug. 25 2010).
35. Sonya Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 489 (2006).
36. Id. at 491.
37. Id. at 492.
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disobedience," a concept similar to civil disobedience where artists
will deliberately put themselves at risk of violating the law that
governs intellectual and tangible property. 8 This concept serves as a
sort of rebellion with a purpose nobler than simply pulling pranks.
Rather, it is a plea for the freedom to create and for a renaissance in
the marketplace of ideas.
Katyal then presents a few examples of recent semiotic
disobedience. In 1999, Nike implemented a promotional program
that allowed consumers to personalize their shoes with a word of their
choice next to the Nike logo.39 One person, Jonah Peretti, elected to
have the word "sweatshop" stitched onto his personalized shoes."
However, Nike reserved the right to reject a petition for a stitched
word if such a word fell within a predetermined category such as
"profanity or inappropriate slang."4 1 Although Peretti was never
granted an enshrined jab at Nike on his shoes, his actions serve as one
demonstration of rebellious behavior against a corporation. Another
example involves Label This, a group that determines "which
products include genetically engineered ingredients and then prints
up labels which members independently attach to products in grocery
stores before they are sold."42 The group hired an artist to alter the
packaging of products with his own artistic work to subvert the
commercial space.43 Katyal even uses the Yes Men's stunt against the
Dow Chemical Corporation as an example." The Yes Man stunt
against the Chamber thus demonstrates how continuous this strain of
semiotic disobedience is in the present time; it is still widespread for
iconoclasts to mock the captains of government and industry, even
though it comes with legal consequences. The Chamber is the "king"
of big business, representing an elite clientele. They are thus the easy
target for the perennial semiotic deviant.
Trademark law has generally favored the target of semiotic
deviance. William E. Ridgway explains a distinction between patent,
copyright, and trademark law. As Ridgway explains, "Patents and
copyrights remedy a public goods problem by providing limited
38. Id. at 494.
39. Id. at 504.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 505-06.
43. Id. at 506.
44. Id. at 505.
118 [33:1
exclusivities in return for the creation of new ideas and expression." 45
In essence, patents and copyrights strike a balance between the
incentive to create and the resulting societal costs. However,
trademarks "impose exclusionary rights that narrow the public
domain."4 6 In other words, the big distinction is consumer confusion.
This key element to trademarks shifts the balance and makes the
property holders' interests less worthy of protection than the
consumers' interests.4 Thus while copyrights and patents generally
hurt the consumer, trademarks allow consumers to rely on their
knowledge of the quality of the product, which promotes social
interest.48
Of course, trademark protection does not always outweigh First
Amendment concerns. Fair use is still a legitimate defense to
49
consumer confusion, and consumer confusion is not easy to prove.
Case law shows that one of the noticeable qualities that plaintiffs
seem to share is that they are often private, profit-based
organizations. In Mattel v. MCA Records, the court stated that "'in
general the [Lanham] Act should be construed to apply to artistic
works only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion
outweighs the public interest in free expression."" In that case, the
Mattel Corporation sued numerous record companies for the use of
the Barbie trademark in the Aqua song, "Barbie Girl."" The court
ruled that "the song title does not explicitly mislead as to the source
of the work; it does not, explicitly or otherwise, suggest that it was
produced by Mattel."52 Essentially, the court determined that
consumers would not mistake Aqua's song with the Barbie doll.
In another 9th Circuit decision, the court analyzed parody as an
element of confusion." Courts have utilized both a six and eight-
factored test to analyze confusion. The court in AMF Inc. v.
Sleekcraft Boats created the eight-factor test as follows:
45. William E. Ridgway, Revitalizing the Doctrine of Trademark Misuse, 21




49. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1946).
50. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999) (2d Cir. 1989).
51. Id. at 899.
52. Id. at 902.
53. Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1403 (1997).
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(1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3)
similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5)
marketing channels used; (6) type of goods and the degree of
care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) defendant's
intent in selecting the mark; (8) likelihood of expansion of the
product line.'
In Dr. Seuss Enterprises, the question was whether the classic Dr.
Seuss children's book, The Cat in the Hat, had been confused with
The Cat NOT in the Hat!, a parody about the OJ Simpson trial."
Interestingly, the court does not go into much depth as to what the
elements of parody are. Rather, the court states that there are
"confusing parodies and non-confusing parodies," the distinction
being that "[t]rue parody will be so obvious that a clear distinction is
preserved between the source of the target and the source of the
parody."56
This holding at once poses two issues. The first issue is an ironic
one: Can a parody be too good? It seems intuitive that something
created for mocking, humorous value, or "merely amusing," as the
Ninth Circuit in Dr. Seuss Enterprises flippantly calls it, will resemble
its target. One need only turn on the television to see parody, but
there seems to be an assumption by the Dr. Seuss Enterprises court
that the parody will never quite be precise in nature. Yet parody adds
to the confusion and, therefore, to the possible liability when the
parody depicts the target accurately. One may think of the Rob
Reiner film, This Is Spinal Tap, the first of the now popular line of
"mockumentaries," and how much more poor a film it would have
been if it had not been so realistic. 7 This film certainly confused
many people and may have seemed to be a true documentary of a
real band to the untrained eye." Perhaps the movie avoided liability
only because the mark that was "stolen" was not a mark at all, but
rather the idea/expression of the 1970s and 1980s heavy metal scene,
and not a particular band.
The ironic position of holding an accurate parody more likely to
be liable, in general, must necessarily remain untenable in a semiotic
54. AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979).
55. Dr. Seuss Enter., 109 F.3d at 1403.
56. Id. at 1405.
57. Roger Ebert, This is Spinal Tap, ROGEREBERT.COM (Mar. 1, 1985), http://roger
ebert.suntimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/19850301/REVIEWS/503010301/1023.
5& Id.
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democracy. Katyal cites a piece in the New York University Law
Review by Jack Balkin who states:
Freedom of speech is appropriative because it draws on
existing cultural resources; it builds on cultural material that
lay to hand. Dissenters draw on what they dislike in order to
criticize it; artists borrow from previous examples and build
on artistic conventions; even casual conversation draws on
common topics and expressions .... In a democratic culture
people are free to appropriate elements of culture that lay to
hand, criticize them, build upon them, and create something
59
new that is added to the mix of culture and its resources.
Although one may be hesitant to describe semiotic disobedience
as a new sort of liberation movement, such as the Civil Rights
Movement of the 1960s, certainly there is nothing more American or
constitutional than affirming the right to free expression and
increasing liberty. As Katyal states:
By reoccupying the symbol, and then reinscribing it with a
new meaning, semiotic disobedience creates a modality that
shifts the character of the speech in two major ways: first, the
identity of the speaker shifts from a corporation to a potential
consumer; and second, the identity of the brand shifts from a
commercial commodity into an expression of political
significance.'
Thus, the idea that a parody can be too perfect or too realistic
flies in the face of a basic right to free expression. The numinous
quality of a particularly poignant parody is just as much a part of the
beauties and guarantees of the First Amendment as the right to
peacefully protest. In fact, parody may be the most salient form of
peaceful and more importantly, ironic, protest.
However, one must accord a certain respect to the argument that
too realistic a parody can easily hurt a corporation or some other
entity. The case at hand with the Yes Men and the Chamber provides
a great example of a parody that was too good and which could have
had dire consequences. It is easy to imagine a situation where news
from a fake press conference could severely affect the economy.
Therefore, the balance of interests seems to favor advocacy and
59. Katyal, supra note 35, at 510.
60. Id. at 512.
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lobbyist groups, and the government. However, the constitutional
issue is not one sided. As Ridgway states:
Origin may militate in favor of an equitable misuse doctrine
that emphasizes First Amendment values. Within First
Amendment jurisprudence, one mode of argument, which
Eugene Volokh calls the "constitutional tension method,"
identifies certain values that the Constitution explicitly
protects and then suggests that the Constitution's free speech
guarantee must sometimes yield to these values. Of course,
this method is not determinative; the Constitution contains
several "values," such as democracy, private property, and
equality, to which the First Amendment cannot automatically
defer without eviscerating free speech. Rather, the
constitutional origins of patent and copyright law simply
weigh in favor of less exacting First Amendment scrutiny.6 1
Ridgway correctly argues that trademark protection is special
because it is an intellectual property device that, when imposed, gives
the public more clarity regarding their purchases and use. As the case
law demonstrates, if courts deem consumer confusion to be
problematic, they will regularly uphold a trademark infringement
claim, including ones brought by constituent-based groups. One
court dismissed a case where the People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals ("PETA") sued the defendant, Michael Doughney, for
appropriating the use of the internet domain name "PETA.ORG." 62
In this case, Doughney created a site claiming that "PETA" or
"People Eating Tasty Animals" stood for the eating of meat and the
wearing of fur, two of several claims on Doughney's site which are
diametrically opposed to the real PETA's values. The court had no
problem affirming the lower court's granting of summary judgment in
favor of PETA and ordered Doughney to release the domain name to
PETA.63
In the present case between the Chamber and the Yes Men, the
Chamber should prevail because it is an advocacy group. The
distinction may seem superficial, but the argument arises from the
practical effects of the confusion, which the court may deem a factor
of the confusion element of the Lanham Act protection. The
61. Ridgway, supra note 45, at 1561-62.
62. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th
Cir. 2001).
63. Id. at 371.
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Chamber, along with all lobbyist groups and government entities,
represent too many people and sub-entities to risk consumer
confusion. In the Mattel case, consumer confusion, even if it was
found, would not lead to dire economic consequences. Sure the
balance of the market of dolls may have shifted, but causing
confusion about an advocacy group could lead to lost constituents,
withdrawal of investments, and so forth. The next section will discuss
commercial intent, another element of the Lanham Act protection.
IV. Commercial Intent
In 1996, Congress expanded the ambit of Lanham Act protection
by enacting the Federal Trademark Dilution Act ("FTDA"), "which
prohibits the 'commercial use in commerce' of a 'famous' mark, if
that use causes 'the lessening of the capacity' of the mark 'to
distinguish goods or services.'"" Currently, the statute reads, "[t]he
registrant shall not be entitled to recover profits or damages unless
the acts have been committed with knowledge that such imitation is
intended to be used to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive."' Thus, not only must a parody confuse the public, but it
also must have some sort of commercial intent.
Case law has generally held that parody, especially when
constituting "humor" and "visual and verbal editorial comment,"
enjoys a full First Amendment protection.' In Hoffman v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc., a magazine digitally altered images of actors from
famous films, such as Dustin Hoffman from the film, Tootsie.7
Hoffman sued under the Lanham Act after his cross-dressing
character from Tootsie was altered to appear wearing contemporary
spring fashions.' The Ninth Circuit held that the commercial purpose
of the advertisements was "inextricably entwined with [these]
expressive elements]" and therefore deserved full First Amendment
protection.' Similarly in Mattel, the Ninth Circuit held that "Barbie
Girl is not purely commercial speech, and is therefore fully protected
[under the First Amendment]."70 Referencing Hoffman, the court in
Mattel reasoned that the humor and lampooning character of the song
64. Ridgway, supra note 45, at 1564.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1946).
66. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F. 3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 2001).
67. Id. at 1183.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1185.
70. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 906-907 (9th Cir. 2002).
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falls squarely within the "noncommercial use exemption" of the
FTDA."
While it is true that the FTDA has a noncommercial use
exemption,72 the court in Mattel seems to extend a carte blanche to all
types of parody groups. The Mattel court argues that, in and of itself,
humor and by extension, parody, constitutes a purpose outside of
commercial use.73 The basis for this understanding of the FTDA is
theoretically sound. The Mattel court quotes the legislative history
behind the FTDA, stating that "'Noncommercial use' refers to a use
that consists entirely of noncommercial, or fully constitutionally
protected, speech."74 The court states the exemption includes
parodies."
This sweeping exemption should not always hold muster, contrary
to the Mattel court's understanding. The Chamber, for instance,
makes the point that the Yes Men, through their prank, publicized
themselves right before the release of their then upcoming film."
Distinct from the doctored picture of Hoffman or the song, "Barbie
Girl," the entirety of the Yes Men's career is completely dependent
on parody. Commercial benefit is not incidental to the parody as it is
in the case of Mattel. Rather, commercial benefit is directly related to
the parody. To hold otherwise would devalue the commercial intent
element of the Lanham Act. If courts deem commercial intent
incidental to alternate purposes of selling a product, how could any
entity be held accountable for theft of a trademark? It could be
argued that any theft of trademark falls under the protected speech of
freedom of expression. A company sporting a knock-off could, in
other words, claim that the knock-off is exempt from liability under
the Lanham Act due to a First Amendment protection.
Rather, the Mattel court's reliance on legislative intent is
misplaced. The court states, "Upon introducing the counterpart bills,
sponsors in each house explained that the proposed law 'will not
prohibit or threaten noncommercial expression, such as parody,
satire, editorial and other forms of expression that are not part of a
commercial transaction.', 7 Thus, the Congressional records explicitly
71. Id.
72. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1946).
73. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 906.
74. Id. at 905.
75. Id.
76. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 7, Chamber of Commerce of the US v.
Servin, 1:09-cv-02014-RWR (filed Oct. 26, 2009).
77. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 905.
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mention parody as something that would fall under noncommercial
expression. This type of appeal to legislative history shows the fallacy
in using such evidence for an understanding of how the law should
always be interpreted. Justice Antonin Scalia stated that where a
statute's plain meaning "produces an absurd, and perhaps
unconstitutional, result, [it is] entirely appropriate to consult all
public materials, including the background of [the statute] and the
legislative history of its adoption."" Here, in the case of the Chamber
and the Yes Men, strict adherence to plain meaning would produce
an absurd result. The problem with analyzing a statute utilizing
legislative intent is that Congress can never anticipate every outcome
that would lead to a noncommercial exemption. The Congressional
record, while listing parody, nowhere delineates what is meant by
parody. In the case of the Yes Men, parody is the entirety of their
work. 9 Rather than utilizing legislative intent, courts should adopt an
ad hoc approach to decisions of this nature, where the legislative
intent may control in conventional cases but which must be discarded
in cases such as this. The absurdity in the result of such an exemption
for the Yes Men would allow them to parody anyone and anything,
no matter how confusing the mimickery.
Many courts, like the Ninth Circuit in Mattel, and scholars laud
the drive towards freedom of speech in the balance of First
Amendment and trademark interests. Some scholars such as
Ridgway have noticed courts making distinctions between protected
and unprotected speech in terms of trademark, where a majority of
courts "categorize trademark use as unprotected 'commercial' speech
on the basis of any commercial intent or impact on a trademark
holder's own commercial interests."" Ridgway cites the case,
Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Bucci as evidence
of the way courts generally handle such trademark versus First
Amendment cases. In that case, Bucci, a pro-life activist, took the
domain name plannedparenthood.com. 82 Planned Parenthood then
attempted to enjoin Bucci from operating such a site." As the court
78. Id. (citing Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527(Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
79. THE YES MEN Fix THE WORLD, http://theyesmenfixtheworld.com, (last visited
Aug. 25 2010).
80. Ridgway, supra note 45, at 1574.
81. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1430
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
82. Id. at 1432.
83. Id.
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stated, "The question the Court must decide, then, is whether
defendant's use of plaintiff's mark is properly viewed as in connection
with the distribution or advertising of goods or services."8" The court
held, "[D]efendant's use of plaintiffs mark is 'commercial' for three
reasons: (1) defendant is engaged in the promotion of a book, (2)
defendant is, in essence, a non-profit political activist who solicits
funds for his activities, and (3) defendant's actions are designed to,
and do, harm plaintiff commercially."'
Essentially, the court held that the "[s]ite harmed Planned
Parenthood commercially and that Bucci solicited funds on his radio
show while mentioning the website."" Thus, the court employed a
standard that limited First Amendment protection to avoid the
absurd result that "'commercial' speech would include all speech that
is sold, including books, newspapers, and magazines, and the
government could ban any speakers with economic intent, such as
workers who rally for higher pay."a
Ridgway makes the point that the noncommercial use exemption
favors "critical and parodic treatments over other uses of protected
material."8 Ridgway goes on to say that parody and humor very
often advance "trademark law's central purpose of reducing
consumer search costs."' Although Ridgway correctly identifies the
state of affairs in the trademark versus First Amendment balance, he
fails to point out the inconsistencies in the current doctrine. In the
next section, the current doctrine will be critiqued for applying ad
hoc, discretionary, and exceptional standards in one regard, while
professing a deep-seated devotion to First Amendment protection on
the other. Such a doctrine leads to a vague standard which does not
adequately distinguish various types of consumer confusion and
commercial intent.
V. Proposal
The fact that scholars and courts overlook distinctions within
parody groups is the primary fallacy in this area of jurisprudence.
Courts have done a poor job in defining parody. The court in Dr.
Seuss Enterprises uses the dictionary to define parody as "a 'literary
84. Id. at 1435.
85. Id. at 16.
86. Ridgway, supra note 45, at 1573.
87. Id. at 1573-74.
88. Id. at 1582.
89. Id. at 1583.
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or artistic work that broadly mimics an author's characteristic style
and holds it up to ridicule."" The Mattel court, rather than define
parody, accepts the legislative understanding of parody as part of
protected expression in the milieu of satire, editorial, and other forms
of expression.1
The court in People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals defines
parody, but in so doing ironically obfuscates the discussion and
almost certainly would have been better off leaving the term vague as
is. The court defines parody as a "simple form of entertainment
conveyed by juxtaposing the irreverent representation of the
trademark with the idealized image created by the mark's owner." 3
The court attempts to elucidate this definition further, stating that a
parody must "convey two simultaneous-and contradictory-
messages: that it is the original, but also that it is not the original and
is instead a parody."' Ultimately the court turns the discussion of
parody into a matter of balancing the rights of the social critic to
create a simulacrum faithful to the original work and the risk of
consumer confusion.95 An, "effective parody," the court states, "will
diminish the risk of consumer confusion 'by conveying [only] just
enough of the original design to allow the consumer to appreciate the
point of parody.'""
Thus, while the court does on its face further a definition of
parody, the problem of definition is not solved. Rather, the court
uses terms such as "effective" in a subjective manner as to a
legitimate parody may be. This type of language only creates more
confusion and equivocation as to what an effective parody, let alone
just a parody, actually is. Additionally, instead of essentially choosing
a side in the debate, favoring either the interest of preserving social
criticism in the form of mockery or the interest of preserving
consumer rights, the court echoes the balancing act. Such a
reiteration of the question does not advance the analysis of defining
90. Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1401 (1997).
91. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2002).
92. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 263 F.3d at 359.
93. Id. at 366 (quoting L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 34 (1st
Cir. 1987)).
94. Id. (quoting Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ. Group, Inc., 886
F.2d 490,494 (2d Cir. 1989)).
95. Id.
96. Id. (quoting Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1486
(10th Cir. 1987)).
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parody but rather repeats the obvious. Thus, the court fails to
adequately define parody.
Parody, while mentioned, is not defined in the Lanham Act.9
There are three basic defenses to trademark infringement. The most
notable one in this case, "fair use," which includes "parodying," has
already been discussed.' The other two defenses are "all forms of
news reporting and news commentary" and "any noncommercial use
of a mark."9 Even if the Mattel court correctly assessed the legislative
intent to exempt parody from trademark infringement, there is no
delineation of what constitutes parody.'"
In the case of the Yes Men and the Chamber, there are many
distinctions that could be made between the work of the Yes Men and
for instance, the song, "Barbie Girl." As the court states, the song by
Aqua "[d]oes not explicitly mislead to the source of the work; it does
not, explicitly or otherwise, suggest that it was produced by Mattel.""o'
Rather, the song title and the lyrics of the song itself reflect the values
and superficialities that the Mattel Barbie doll represents.102
However, in the case of the Yes Men, the public is dealing with a
group that focuses solely on parody. The Yes Men claim that "[t]he
stunt was intended to show how climate policy was being held hostage
to corporate greed."0 3 However, the Yes Men's commercial exploits
involve parody films. The Yes Men describe their activities in their
most recent filming as "posing [as the] top executives of corporations
they hate."'" The entirety of the movie revolves around the Yes Men
parodying and posing as representatives of corporations. For
example, "[a]s Exxon, Andy and Mike demonstrate a new biofuel
made from climate-change victims."'o' Perhaps because the Yes Men
achieve commercial success primarily because of their work in
parody, the Yes Men have decided to pull their recent film from
DVD distribution as evidence that they are not liable for trademark
97. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1946).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2002).
101. Id. at 902.
102. Id.
103. Suzanne Goldenberg, US Chamber of Commerce falls victim to 'fraud' over
climate hoax, THE GUARDIAN ENV'T BLOG (Oct. 19, 2009, 6:50 PM),
http://www.guardian.co.uklenvironment/blog/2009/oct/19/chamber-commerce-climate-
hoax.
104. Story, THE YES MEN FIX THE WORLD, http://theyesmenfixtheworld.com
/story.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2010).
105. Id.
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infringement." Rather, the film has been released for free on
BitTorrent, requiring no payment for viewing and asking for
donations instead." There are a number of other reasons besides
avoiding presumed commercial intent for why the Yes Men released
their film for free. For one, none of the major networks will promote
or distribute the film until the lawsuit is resolved.as Additionally,
They also did it to avoid paying for E&O or 'errors and
omissions' insurance, which documentary filmmakers are
often required to buy if they can't verify that every detail in
the fore or background of every shot is free of copyright
infringement. The E&O requirement is a huge hurdle for
independent filmmakers.'"
Nonetheless, the fact that commercial distributors will not
promote the film and the proximity of the decision to make the film
available for free during the lawsuit shows how much the Yes Men's
parody is directly linked to commercial intent.
Thus, unlike to the Aqua song, there is not much else to the Yes
Men aside from parody. "Barbie Girl" is a song that relies on music,
videos, lyrics, production, and electronics, none of which solely rely
on any Mattel product.o Whether one believes the Yes Men parody
of the Chamber was confusing, it is clear that the type of parody in
which the Yes Men engage is very different from the type of parody
that Aqua engaged in with their song. The disparity in just these two
examples demonstrates the necessity of a judicial definition of
parody.
This lack of judicial definition seems to stem in part from the
general catchall exemption from trademark infringement that comes
from the First Amendment. Case law, scholarship, and certainly
United States legal history suggest the importance of the doctrine of
freedom of speech in our "American semiotic democracy." The
Mattel case is, for instance, replete with references to the First
Amendment and the public policy behind freedom of expression in
the form of parody. As the court states, "[T]ension with the First
106. Samuel Axon, The Yes Men Movie Dodges Legal Challenge by Launching on





110. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Amendment also exists in the trademark context, especially where
the mark has assumed an expressive function beyond mere
identification of a product or service." "
Katyal claims that the First Amendment "already favors semiotic
democracy over disobedience where national symbols are
concerned.""' She even brings up an early case where the abolitionist
William Lloyd Garrison, in 1854, "burned his copy of the Constitution
to protest its original bias toward slavery.""' Such an act, states
Katyal, "add[s] a classically new focus to the old regime of civil
disobedience, because it forces the democratic and judicial processes
to grapple with the alteration of properties that fall outside traditional
realms of protected speech and intellectual property."1 4
In terms of the original intent of the First Amendment, there is a
rich history of the conflicts and debates regarding the federal
government's power in legislating speech. The proponents of a
smaller federal government, such as Thomas Jefferson and Andrew
Hamilton, had been embroiled in free speech issues since long before
the revolution."5 For instance, in 1735, Hamilton defended John
Peter Zenger, who was tried for "seditious libel.""' Hamilton's
victorious defense became widely known and is one of the forbearers
of the right to free speech in the United States.117
As important as free speech has been to this country, there have
been numerous exceptions to this protection. The most famous
utterance of the exception to the seemingly catchall protection from
governmental intrusion into free speech comes from Schenck v. US
where Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, in referring to an obvious
exception to First Amendment protection, coined the term "shouting
fire in a crowded theater.""8  Although the Supreme Court has
tended to allow more dissident, obscene, and politically hazardous
speech,"' the fact that unfettered free speech is still clearly an issue
suggests that absolute freedom of speech is not a right where there
111. Id. at 904.
112. Katyal, supra note 35, at 562.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Doug Linder, The Trial of Peter Zenger: Birth of freedom of the press,




118. Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
119. See New York Times Co. v. US, 403 US 713 (1971) (allowing the New York Times
and Washington Post to publish the then classified Pentagon Papers).
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are harmful consequences. In an article on the effects of users
utilizing trademarks on social networking sites, Professor Lisa
Ramsey suggests,
Impersonation of brands on social network sites may cause a
variety of harms if users believe and rely on the imposter's
false statement of identity. If users disclose personal
information to the imposter, identity theft, phishing, or an
increase in spam emails may occur. Even if the user suffers no
financial harm, he or she may feel violated ... If goods or
services promoted on the page are falsely represented to come
from the markholder, customers may mistakenly purchase
another company's products, which may be of lower quality.
If the imposter posts false or misleading information about the
company or its products, this can harm the markholder and
the public if stock prices drop, of if individuals or entities
forgo future purchases, employment, partnerships, or other
interaction with the company due to the untruthful
information."
Ramsey therefore recognizes that users of trademarks on social
networking sites may cause obvious and ruinous harm, similar to a
parody group irreparably besmirching the name of its victim.
Thus, in the case of trademark infringement, ad hoc, courts can
take practical determinations into consideration and still uphold the
basic tenets of First Amendment rights. In the case of the Chamber,
potential consumer confusion can seriously damage political and
economic ties. The Chamber is ranked as one of the top five best-
known and respected organizations in Washington.121 It represents an
enormous amount of wealth and if disaster should strike which
induces businesses to leave the Chamber, the entire lobbying industry
would change overnight. This suggests that there should be more
trademark protection for advocacy groups and governmental
institutions, as a single trademark infringement included in a parody
could, as in this case with the Yes Men, cause temporary panic.
Freedom of speech is a very important right and in a case such as
Mattel, where the stakes are somewhat lower, the right to free speech
trumps trademark protection. However, because the courts do have
120. Lisa P. Ramsey, Brandjacking on Social Networks: Trademark Infringement by
Impersonation of Markholders, 58 BUFF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 15).
121. About Us, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE http://www.uschamber.comlabout/
(last visited Aug. 25, 2010).
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the authority to limit freedom of speech when practically necessary,
advocacy groups such as the Chamber deserve an extra level of
protection.
VI. Conclusion
Although the Yes Men may have had a legitimate anti-corporate
message and may have pulled off their stunt very well, their actions
could have caused a panic. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and
other advocacy groups, are vastly important to the political and
economic realities of the average American household. Their
lobbying helps influence the level of taxes, defense spending, or as in
this case, environmental policy reform. First Amendment protection
should generally be a presumed right in the case of most trademark
cases. However, in cases where the stakes are high, the risk of
consumer confusion is too great to allow an unfettered right to
parody.
